Memorandum of Written Evidence to the Committee – January 2015 by Ward, SJ et al.
1 
 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport's Expert Working Group on Football 
Supporter Ownership and Engagement 
Memorandum of Written Evidence to the Committee – January 2015: 
Dr Sara Ward, Dr Tom Scanlon & Professor Tony Hines 
Manchester Metropolitan University, Business School (MMUBS) 
Introduction 
1. Dr Sara Ward. Dr Tom Scanlon and Professor Tony Hines form the Football Research 
Cluster at MMUBS.  Since 2009, they have analysed governance structures within 
supporter owned football clubs.  Sara Ward’s research focused on six football clubs 
adopting varying supporter ownership models with differing fortunes.1  The sample 
encompassed clubs who had matured with the model (Hamburger SV), clubs who had 
adopted it out of financial necessity (Brentford FC, Stockport County FC & Exeter City 
FC) and newly formed clubs (Chester FC & FC United of Manchester) which have 
evolved using the model.  Results from their research form the basis of this submission.2  
Key Recommendations 
2. The Authors recommend: 
(i) Introduction of an annual licensing system similar to that already in operation 
in Germany to prevent football clubs getting into such financial ‘dire straits’. 
(ii) Tax incentives and financial benefits given to supporter owned football clubs to 
alleviate budgetary constraints. 
(iii) Sharing of revenue within and between leagues to ease the need to over-spend 
to compete in an uneven playing field. 
(iv) Legislation to allow one ‘fan’ Director to be elected onto every Football Club’s 
Board to ensure long-term sustainability of their club. 
(v) Introduction of an independent modern day regulator to audit and govern the 
football industry in the U.K.   
                                                          
1 Ward, S. (2013)  A Critical Analysis of Governance Structures within Supporter Owned Football Clubs, PhD 
Thesis, Manchester Metropolitan University 
2 Ward, S., Scanlon, T., Hines, A.  (2013) Mutuality Ownership Form in Professional Sports:  Football, Nonprofit 
& Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 42(4), p. 763-780 
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Consider the Role of Supporter Ownership in a Football Club’s Long Term Sustainability 
3. In Germany, the ’50 + 1’ rule (51% majority shareholding to the fans and 49% to private 
investors) and a strict club licensing scheme are particularly important to the German 
model3. Arguably, the current German regulatory system in operation is more desirable 
than the English one in terms of encouraging financially sustainable practices. 
However, the German model, which is influenced by legal frameworks and cultural 
expectations, aims to achieve more diverse and inclusive football club boards. The 
question we need to pose is do we need to look at Germany for solutions? Alternatively, 
is English football and the environment it operates in so fundamentally different that 
such radical changes would be impossible, even if they were judicious? 
  
4. In England, 68 football clubs have entered into administration since the founder 
members of the Premier League took the decision to break away from the Football 
League in 19924. In a business sector that at any given time consists of just 92 football 
clubs this is a staggering number.  Which in any other sector would automatically attract 
the attention of Parliament. 
 
5. Two specific financial aspects can be contributed to the financial troubles within so 
many football clubs in the English game. Firstly, the continuing operation of companies 
with unsustainable high debt levels and the inability of clubs to control their biggest 
cost, that of players’ wages, is having a detrimental impact on the sport. The injection 
of cash by private ‘benefactors’, whether in the form of ‘soft loans’ or as equity, 
amounts to risky financial practice in an attempt to buy success and show the 
‘benefactors’ ambition. The main danger to the football club is when the steady supply 
of unearned income ceases, for example, Portsmouth FC, Rangers FC, Leeds United 
FC5. From 2015-16, new regulations will affect Championship clubs in England 
designed to prevent owners from funding their clubs through loans.6 These new 
                                                          
3 Ward, S., Lammert, J., Hines, A.  (2015)  Mutuality and German Football – an Exemplar of Sustainable Sport 
Governance Structures?, Unpublished Journal Article, Work in Progress 
4 Beech, J., Horsman, S., Magraw, J.  (2008)  The Circumstances in which English Football Clubs Become 
Insolvent.  The CIBS Working Paper Series – no. 4 
5 Draper, R. (29th December 2013) How Successive Foreign Owners betrayed the Supporters of Portsmouth, The 
Mail on Sunday 
6 BBC (25th April 2012) Championship clubs vote in favour of Financial Fair Play 
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regulations are based on UEFA’s break-even model of Financial Fair Play and come 
after the Football League’s research revealed the 72 clubs of the Championship, League 
One and League Two are on course to accumulate £2bn of debt.7    
 
6. Such events can happen because of the ‘benefactor’ suddenly finding their core 
business, which generates the funding getting into trouble, or the personal 
circumstances of the ‘benefactor’ changing. If this happens, the club is inevitably facing 
financial problems. The business is suddenly unsustainable and in particular is in a 
weak position to repay any ‘soft loans’ which have abruptly been recalled. In short, this 
model of regular cash injections from ‘benefactors’ is highly risky and all too often 
proves unsustainable as shown by events at Brentford FC8 and Exeter City FC.  
Furthermore, it is based on an approach that distorts the competitive balance of a 
League through endeavours, which are not based on sports performance, which many 
would see as unethical in a sports context. 
 
7. There are other worrying consequences of injecting unearned income into clubs. 
‘Benefactor’ driven clubs help to fuel the already high rate of wage inflation in the 
transfer market. There is a tendency for such clubs to influence other clubs to adopt this 
process in their pursuit for success. To be ambitious necessarily means finding 
investment to compete with others in the same position. As the wages spiral escalates, 
the scale of operation financially becomes more stretched up and down the footballing 
pyramid. The differences between wages in different tiers of the pyramid becomes ever 
more pronounced. Consequently, this leads to high volatility for football clubs who are 
relegated down a League and presents major challenges for those promoted to a higher 
League. 
 
8. Our studies have highlighted that in terms of its effect on the game in England the 
alternative model of supporter ownership not only potentially avoids these pitfalls, it 
also brings the club back to legal ownership as well as psychological ownership in the 
club’s community. Fans, in effect, have taken back the club from owners who pursue 
                                                          
7 Deloitte (2013) Annual Review of Football Finance (season 2012/2013), Manchester 
8 Ward, S., Scanlon, T., Hines, A (2015)  Mutuality and Football – A Perfect Match?, Unpublished Journal Article, 
Work in Progress 
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personal agendas and who may have no commitment or connection with the 
community. By adopting the legal format of supporter ownership (or as an Industrial 
Provident Society), fans operate their own clubs as businesses, setting the club’s 
strategic objectives themselves rather than leaving these objectives to the type of 
absentee owners driven by a profit or a ‘celebrity status’ motive.9 
 
9. Our research has highlighted that supporter ownership ensures that the club is owned 
by a body who are unequivocally focused on the value of the stadium as the club’s 
home, rather than as a financial asset and who are much less likely to sacrifice the 
medium term future for short term glory. Supporter ownership is both transparent and 
democratic, involving hundreds or thousands of supporters, meaning there is a less 
stringent need for the ‘fit and proper persons’ tests.10 Clubs are less likely to go into 
debt, due to their non-profit, mutual legal structure preventing them from going into 
administration, and Board officials are more likely to act as custodians than gamblers. 
This helps to reduce the need for top-down measures such as the football creditors rule 
and points deductions for insolvency. 
 
10. We suggest that supporter ownership would greatly benefit the game in the U.K. After 
years of failure to self-regulate, English football has now attracted the interest of 
politicians due to clubs’ failure to operate within a financially sustainable model. The 
two areas English football could choose to implement are the introduction of effective 
club licensing and a major shift from the culture of dependency on so-called benefactors 
to a model which has fan ownership embedded in it. The German ‘50+1’ model offers 
an example of good practice from which they can learn. 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Jaquiss, K., (2000), ‘Football, fans and fat cats: whose football club is it anyway?’ in S. Hamil, J. Michie, C. 
Oughton and S. Warby (eds), Football in the Digital Age: Whose Game is it Anyway?, Edinburgh: Mainstream 
10 Supporters Direct (2011) Developing Football Regulation to Encourage Supporter Community Ownership in 
Football, Briefing Paper No. 2, London:Supporters Direct 
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Which Governance Structures are the most Appropriate for Supporter Owned Football Clubs to 
Operate Effectively? 
11. The English football market finances appear to be in very good health and impervious 
to the current Euro-wide financial crises. Yet beneath the apparent financial buoyancy 
a different story emerges, one of fan exploitation, spiralling debt with the threat of 
bankruptcy hanging over many clubs.  The ‘peculiar’ economics of sport has always 
raised governance questions.11 It has been widely accepted that the championship race 
being the joint product of the participating clubs, requires more than the degree of 
regulation typical for other industries. Over the course of the last few years, the football 
authorities have taken steps to improve standards of corporate governance at football 
clubs. These have included introducing a ‘fit and proper persons’ test to clubs Directors, 
improving the transparency of agent dealings through an annual report (Football 
League) and establishing sporting sanctions for clubs in administration. However, Lord 
Triesman recognises current regulation is not conducive to supporter owned clubs 
‘broadly speaking we are organised around companies and company law and I think 
that is a reality of our circumstance’.12 
 
12. For many years political commentators have hailed the German society for the 
responsible form of ‘social capitalism’ its businesses have pioneered. While the need 
for a commercially successful economy was accepted, so too was the necessity for 
industry to consider its wider social responsibilities by participating in important social 
welfare programmes, a so called ‘middle way’ was established (similar to the ‘Big’ 
Society idea pioneered by the coalition Government in 2010). The model has important 
lessons for those currently involved in the debate about English football’s future. While 
the problems brought by increasing commercialisation cannot be ignored for much 
longer, simple calls for regulation and price capping powers are likely to fail on legal 
grounds and increase tension between different sections of the footballing community.  
 
                                                          
11 Neale, W.C.  (1964) The peculiar economics of professional sports, Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT 
Press:New York, 78 (1), p 1-14  
12 Conn, D. (8th February 2011) Lord Triesman reveals a bullied and impotent F.A. to Commons inquiry 
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13. The Burns Review recommended the creation of a semi-autonomous ‘Regulations and 
Compliance Unit’ to govern the English game.13  Furthermore, the Football Governance 
Research Centre14 have consistently called for tighter regulation, arguing that the F.A. 
has failed in its responsibility to ensure the highest individual and organisational 
standards in English football, especially in terms of financial probity and the regulation 
and ownership of clubs. A number of reports into the regulation of football have 
recommended that the F.A. introduce compliance mechanisms, in order to ensure 
financial stability and the integrity of the game.15 Yet the recommendations contained 
within these reports have either been implemented in a diluted form or not been acted 
upon. The growing consensus is that a possible solution to this problem is to by-pass 
the F.A. with a modern day regulator. A claim which has been endorsed by key 
respondents interviewed for this research.  
 
14. Findings from our study have certainly provided much needed empirical evidence to 
this area of concern.  The select committee’s recommendations from the 2011 
Parliamentary Inquiry into football governance were in the main focused on radical 
reforms of the F.A. and the introduction of a licensing system. Whilst the committee 
acknowledged that financial regulations had been tightened in recent years they were 
still left unconvinced that these new rules adopted by the Premier League and the 
Football League are in themselves sufficient enough to curb English football finances. 
The committee state that, ‘often their rules appear to be in response to events rather 
than being proactive. It is right that clubs going into administration should be deducted 
penalty points, but it is important that the F.A. adopts more effective pre-emptive 
measures that anticipate rather than simply follow events.’16 The recommendation of 
the adoption of a licensing system similar to that already in operation in Germany could 
review financial performance and urge clubs to promote a sustainable and long-term 
business plan. 
 
                                                          
13 A full outline of the Burns Review terms of reference, submissions, and conclusions can be viewed at:  Burns, 
L. (2005) Structural Review of the F.A. - Conclusions 
14 Football Governance Research Centre (Michie, J., Oughton, C., Waters, G.) (2001-2006) The State of the 
Game: The Corporate Governance of Football Clubs, London:Birkbeck College 
15 All Party Parliamentary Football Group (2009)  English Football and its Governance report London: HMSO 
16 House of Commons Culture, Media & Sport Committee Enquiry 2011: The Governance of Football 
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15. Our research concurs with these recommendations especially the proactive nature of 
the licensing system to pre-empt football clubs like Chester City FC’s financial 
mismanagement going unnoticed until the ‘final hour’. Despite the good work 
conducted by the select committee and the substantial recommendations the 
researchers’ remain sceptical that the proposed radical changes to the football industry 
in England will come to fruition. This is the fourth such inquiry in the last ten years and 
as with the other reports the proposed reforms have not been actioned.  
 
16. Several state that Supporter Trusts are seen by many as ‘an ambulance service to lower 
league clubs’, a statement our research has not been able to disprove. Most Trusts only 
get the opportunity to be involved in the running of their club when it has gone into 
administration or under the threat of liquidation.  The Trust Boards at Exeter City FC, 
Stockport County FC17 and Brentford FC18 were faced with serious inherited financial 
irregularities and mismanagement. Key personnel at these two clubs have called for 
tighter regulation to be introduced to prevent football clubs being allowed to get into 
such financial ‘dire straits’ in the future. They believe if this were introduced with 
tougher penalties and a governing body set up to audit the changes then supporter 
ownership in football could have a better chance of survival. 
 
17. It would appear that insolvency has become almost a ‘legitimate’ tactic in a football 
club’s business strategy. The moves by both the Premier League and the Football 
League to penalise clubs for going into administration or failing to negotiate a Creditor 
Voluntary Agreement (CVA) can be interpreted as a move to outlaw this tactic. They 
suggest that the high level of football clubs becoming insolvent might be an emergent 
tactic rather than an intended one.  
 
18. The difficult challenge for the game’s authorities now is to design and implement new 
policies that lower debts, whilst gradually withdrawing current policies within the 
                                                          
17 Ward, S.  (2010)  Mutuality and Professional Football, Master of Research Dissertation, Manchester 
Metropolitan University 
18 Ward, S., The 3rd Annual MMU Football Conference, 'Football and its Communities', The Challenges of 
Operating as a Supporter Owned Football Club in the English Football League: A Case Study of Brentford FC, 
National Football Musuem, Manchester. (July 13, 2014 - July 14, 2014) 
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industry. The sharing of revenue within and between leagues is of fundamental 
importance; a point that has been endorsed by the Club and Trust Board Directors 
interviewed for our research.  
 
19. The Football League advised clubs to introduce a ‘60/40’ ratio in relation to overall 
wage expenditure and the football club’s turnover (i.e. 60% of turnover can be spent on 
wages).  However, this policy does not carry any legal requirement or financial 
penalties if not followed. Exeter opted to adhere to the 60% wage ratio when competing 
in League One, which in turn has ensured financial stability, whilst Brentford FC under 
the ownership of Bees United did not set out to achieve this ratio playing in the same 
League. The English supporter owned football clubs interviewed all felt that they are 
competing in an uneven playing field with no legal or financial incentives given for 
being a supporter-owned, community invested football club. Our research provides 
empirical evidence to the current debate that, unless there is drastic change to the way 
football is regulated in the U.K. it will always remain a huge task for supporter owned 
clubs to succeed.  
The Development of a Governance Framework for Supporter Owned Football Clubs 
20. Figure 1 documents the researchers’ newly formed governance framework for 
supporter owned football clubs. The framework illustrates a clear pattern of macro and 
micro influences that affected the six Supporters’ Trusts interviewed for our research. 
Managing and co-ordinating ‘people power’ to form a coherent and compatible 
business plan was a prominent feature. Dealing with raw emotions from a diverse range 
of fans from differing backgrounds to achieve a common purpose was a difficult but 
necessary task. Once this coherency had been achieved, Supporters’ Trusts needed to 
rally support from other relevant external stakeholders, utilising differing forms of the 
media to achieve this unison. 
 
21. Our research also highlighted that the clubs that were more successful than others were 
conforming to the core of the non-profit constitution and applying the ‘one member, 
one vote’ principle. The clubs who showed evidence of this were also found to be more 
community beneficial and adopted a more honest and transparent approach (Hamburger 
SV (HSV), FC United of Manchester, Chester FC). Due to this ethos, these clubs also 
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benefited from increased membership and were able to raise valuable funds.  The 
second section of the framework presents the longer-term governance and 
accountability factors, which need to be put into place once the Trust becomes the 
majority shareholder of the football club. These factors have been split into four main 
areas of Shared Leadership, Board Motivation, Board Roles and Board Structure. 
 
22. The researchers have written key areas for consideration within these four sections, 
which were highlighted as applicable and common practice from the respondents’ data.  
The first area entitled ‘Shared Leadership’ highlighted how successful the Supporters’ 
Trusts were in implementing what they set out to achieve before they took ownership. 
The ability of the Trusts in promoting inclusivity within the club, primarily through 
democratic decision-making varied between clubs. This variance was found to be a key 
factor in whether Supporter Ownership succeeded or not within the clubs visited. 
Another theme prominent in our analysis was the level of understanding of the Directors 
from the Trust and Club Board on the ethos of supporter ownership.  The Supporters’ 
Trusts endeavoured to change the management and/or operational structure of their 
football club. In order to do this all personnel involved in this change management 
process needed to fully embrace and understand the true purpose of a non-profit football 
club.   
 
23. The second area entitled ‘Board Competency’ proved to be vital for the short and long 
term success of Supporter Ownership due to the complexities of running a non-profit 
football club governed by a strict constitution and operating in a challenging and 
financially strained internal environment.  Clubs that have failed in this venture have 
inherited personnel who have not embraced, felt comfortable or understood supporter 
ownership. In addition, the Board members motivations, reasons for joining, individual 
skill base and ability to work where two Boards operate has again been a key for success 
or failure. Within this section, the levels of understanding of the ethos of supporter 
ownership influenced the football clubs’ ability to operate effectively. The lack of 
understanding found in some of the football clubs was due to inherited personnel who 
had no desire to embrace the ethos and were very sceptical of the business model 
working. The majority of the original steering committees involved before the Trust 
took full control recognised that Directors who volunteered for nomination needed to  
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Figure 1 - Governance Framework for Supporter Owned Football Clubs 
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demonstrate their desire and passion for what the Supporters’ Trusts believed in. The 
football clubs who were able to overcome these problems and achieve a common goal 
within their Board(s) were more successful than the clubs who failed in this venture. 
 
24. The third area focused on ‘Board Roles’ which was also indicated as an important 
function from the respondent’s interviews. Once Directors had been elected and the 
mission statement and strategic direction was set it was very important to define the 
roles between the two Boards. Again, the football clubs who organised their tasks 
effectively were able to engage and receive benefits from their external stakeholders 
and also decrease the level of internal politics within the business.  This achievement 
of role clarity was more evident in the clubs who were able to source and attract relevant 
outside expertise. The clubs that were able to recruit experienced and appropriate 
business people demonstrated a more streamlined and organised internal operational 
system than the clubs who did not succeed in this area.   
 
25. Finally, the fourth area of ‘Board Structure’ indicated that the larger the size of the 
Board the more successful the club was. HSV had the most superior and effective 
organisational structure in place. One Board seemed to be the preferred option by 
Chester FC and FCUM clubs but with an odd number of Directors to ensure a positive 
vote. The other three English football clubs (Brentford FC. Stockport County FC & 
Exeter City FC) had differing structures but both relied heavily on volunteers within 
the football club and on the Trust Board. The ability of the football club to work 
effectively with both paid and voluntary Board members was another key theme to 
succeed in a non-profit football club. There was evidence to show that more 
responsibility appeared to be taken if Board members were paid. 
 
Supporter Ownership – The Key to Success 
 
Football clubs that have been owned and/or run by the fans through 
Supporters’ Trusts have generally shown themselves to be more prudent 
and have developed better business practices. In the cases of Exeter 
City FC, Brentford FC and Chester FC’s becoming supporter owned went 
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a considerable way to appease local creditors (e.g. caterers, 
breweries, publishers, launderettes) thus allowing future business 
partnerships to be developed. The supporter ownership business model 
helped develop a community base for the club and provided governance 
benefits, particularly by not allowing the club to be run by a single 
‘benefactor’. However, Board members within the six clubs visited 
have freely admitted to making mistakes in their business strategies 
and underestimating the steep learning curve they have had to 
undertake. By recruiting outside expertise and continuously assessing 
and evolving their key personnel they have been able to tackle the 
clubs forever-changing problems and issues. 
 
The Combined Code (2003)19 stresses that company Boards must avoid being 
too large and unwieldy, and hence ineffective in decision-making. The 
Higgs Review (2003) revealed that for the smaller listed companies 
outside the FTSE 350 the average size of the Board was six. Our research 
found that the football clubs operating with two Boards had on average 
between five and seven Board members on the Club Board but exceeded 
the recommended number on the Trust Board (Exeter City FC, Stockport 
County FC, Brentford FC, and HSV). Chester FC and FCUM had opted for 
between eleven and thirteen Directors on their main Board. These 
findings found evidence that on the Club Board side of the football 
business were consistent with smaller listed companies and in line with 
the recommendations made by Higgs (2003)20 meeting twelve times a year 
at least. However, the large number of members on the Trust Board 
                                                          
19 Committee on Corporate Governance:  The London Stock Exchange (2003), The Combined Code, Gee 
Publishing, London 
20 Higgs, D.  (2003) Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors, Department of Trade and 
Industry, The Stationery Office:London 
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proved to be unwieldy at times and difficult to achieve coherence among 
the Trust Directors. These large numbers were attributed to the fact 
that the positions were voluntary and the required expertise was 
diverse to meet the demands of the club. What has become clear to the 
researchers is that to become a successfully managed supporter owned 
football club the need to clarify clear roles and responsibilities is 
of paramount importance. 
 
Our research has highlighted that in practice the presence of two 
Boards, or in HSV’s case more than two, can be effective if implemented 
correctly. HSV’s system of setting agreed boundaries for the Club 
Board to operate within seems to be the most sensible method of working 
and makes the club more able to adapt to the changing external 
environment. A consistent finding was the friction between the Club 
and Trust Board on key decisions relating to sustainability. The Club 
Boards within HSV, Brentford FC, Stockport County FC and Exeter City 
FC proved to be quite ambitious in their plans and were regularly 
frustrated with the Trust Board’s audit role. Despite this evident 
friction within these clubs HSV and Exeter City FC were seen to have 
found ways to work around these internal problems and both Boards were 
unanimous in their belief that supporter ownership was the only option 
for their football club. 
